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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of Nebraska in an early decision upheld the granting of a writ
of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was forcibly abducted into
the state,'- but this decision was overruled in a subsequent case.10
In State v. Simmons17 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the
granting of a writ of habeas corpus under the same circum-
stances. That decision has never been overruled, 8 but a more
recent Kansas case referred favorably to the majority rule.19
Thus it is well settled that the courts of every jurisdiction of
this country, with the possible exception of Kansas, will not
grant a writ of habeas corpus to release a person convicted of a
crime because he has been forcibly abducted or kidnapped into
the jurisdiction.
EQUITY - TRADE NAME PROTECTION - CHARITABLE
CORPORATION'S RIGHTS AGAINST A BUSINESS
Plaintiff, the "Golden Slipper Square Club," a non-profit,
charitable corporation had presented annual stage shows and
dinners since 1924 at which contributions had been solicited in
order to finance its various charitable activities. Defendant,
a restaurant and night club, adopted the name "Golden Slipper
Restaurant and Catering Service, Inc." in 1948 with intent to
trade on plaintiff's good name. Plaintiff in the lower court ob-
tained an injunction restraining defendant from further use of
its name. On appeal, held: affirmed. A well-established chari-
table corporation is entitled to injunctive relief against a busi-
ness corporation adopting a similar name with the intent to
trade on the charity's good will and reputation."
It has been generally recognized that a trade name of a busi-
ness organization will be protected from infringement.2 At
15. In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N.W. 267 (1890).
16. Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946).
17. 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888).
18. Nor has the case been followed. The question has never since been
raised in Kansas.
19. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918).
1. Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Restaurant and Catering,
Inc., 371 Pa. 92, 88 A.2d 734 (1952).
2. A name which is primarily generic or descriptive cannot be appropri-
ated as a technical trade mark or trade name, but it will be afforded pro-
tection if it has, through usage, acquired a secondary meaning in the public
mind as associated with a certain party or corporation. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Dunnell, 172 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1949); Weatherford v. Eytchison,
90 Cal. App. 2d 379, 202 P.2d 1040 (1949); see American Steel Foundries
v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
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first, the sole basis for trade name protection was to prevent
the "palming off" of one man's goods for those of another, 3 and
such relief was afforded only in situations where products were
in actual competition.4 Later this protection was extended to
cases where the two businesses, while not exactly alike, were of
the same general class.5 With that step, the basis for relief
began to shift from loss of potential customers to the contem-
porary basis of protection of good-will and reputation,6 and
relief has been granted where there has been little if any com-
petition.7 Intent to capitalize on plaintiff's good-will by adoption
of his name has not been deemed a necessary element of the
action,8 but courts have expressed a willingness to afford relief
in doubtful cases more readily where a definite fraudulent intent
has been present.9
It has been pointed out that non-profit corporations as well as
business organizations have an interest in maintaining their
identity, general reputation, financial credit, and ability to raise
funds.1- Consistent with that fact, the courts have held under the
modern rationale that non-profit organizations are entitled to
the same protection of their trade names as is afforded to busi-
nesses.1" Although most of the cases involving non-profit corpora-
3. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Bordon's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510(7th Cir. 1912); Good Housekeeping Shop v. Smitter, 254 Mich. 592, 236
N.W. 872 (1931); accord, Ambassador Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Sherman Com-
pany, 226 I1. App. 247 (1922).
4. Ibid.
5. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Products Corporation 295
Fed. 306 (2d Cir. 1923) (beer and malt syrup); American Tobacco Co. v.
Polacsek, 170 Fed. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (cigarettes and pipe tobacco).
6. Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674 (3d
Cir. 1921); Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 53
F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Ky. 1943) ; Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875(S.D. Fla. 1941); Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Razor Corp., 25 F. Supp.
886 (N.D. Ill. 1938). But cf. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. Pa. 1941). Some courts today still express themselves in terms
of business loss and appear to require actual competition. Esskay Art
Galleries v. Gibbs, 205 Ark. 1157, 172 S.W.2d 924 (1943).
7. One court has gone so far as to grant relief solely on the ground that
the public would think that plaintiff endorsed defendant's product. Triangle
Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1947).
8. Best and Co., Inc. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 377 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948); Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Yellow
Cab Transit Co., 53 F. Supp. 272, 276 (N.D. Ky. 1943).
9. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Razor Corp. 25 F. Supp. 886 (N.D.
Ill. 1938); Consolidated Home Specialties Co. v. Plotkin, 358 Pa. 14, 20, 55
A.2d 404, 407 (1947).
10. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKs § 86 (3d ed. 1929).
11. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, Free & Accepted Masons
of Georgia v. Supreme Grand Lodge, Modern Free & Accepted Colored
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tions have dealt with fraternal organizations, relief was granted
on the same basis in one case where a charity sued another
charity. 2 Furthermore, the language of the courts in fraternal
cases generally has been broad enough to include charitable
societies.23
It has been argued that a charity should be afforded protection
against businesses as well as against other charities when busi-
nesses infringe upon its trade name.1 4 Businesses have been
allowed protection when there was no possibility of competition
between the litigants.15 Therefore, lack of competition between
a business and a charity should be no ground for refusing an
injunction. In like manner, lack of similarity in business pur-
suits has not been a ground for refusing injunctive relief to
businesses- and therefore should not be a ground for refusing
such relief to charities. Since the courts have said that non-
profit corporations are to be extended the same relief as busi-
nesses in this field,'17 it follows logically that no group against
Masons of the World, 105 F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Ga. 1951); Salvation Army
in the United States v. American Salvation Army, 135 App. Div. 268, 120
N.Y. Supp. 471 (1909). In Society of the War of 1812 v. Society of the War
of 1812 in the State of New York, 46 App. Div. 568, 62 N.Y. Supp. 355
(1900), the court said: "The right to injunctive relief is based on interfer-
ences with business, whatever that might be, not necessarily commercial."
Id. at 572, 62 N.Y. Supp. at 358.
12. Salvation Army in the United States v. American Salvation Army,
135 App. Div. 268, 120 N.Y. Supp. 471 (1909).
13. See Grand Lodge of Improved, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks of the World v. Grand Lodge, Improved, Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks of the World, Inc., 50 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent & Protective Order of
Elks of the World, 205 N.Y. 459, 98 N.E. 756 (1912). However, in National
Circle, Daughters of Isabella v. National Order of Daughters of Isabella,
270 Fed. 723 (2d Cir. 1920), the court said: "It is true that some difference
of opinion exists as to whether eleemosynary or charitable corporations
having nothing to sell and which do not make money are beyond the pro-
tection of the law of unfair competition." Id. at 730. It is said later in the
opinion: "The right to injunctive relief against the improper use of a cor-
porate name is, by many of the courts, not limited to corporations engaged
in business and trade, but it extends to charitable, religious, benevolent,
and patriotic societies." Id. at 731. The court here cites Salvation Army
in the United States v. American Salvation Army, 135 App. Div. 268, 120
N.Y. Supp. 471 (1909) with apparent approval.
14. NIMs, UNFAIR COMP TrrION AND TRADE MARKs § 86 (3d ed. 1929).
15. Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. Ibid. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Razor Corporation, 25 F. Supp.
886 (N.D. Ill. 1938).
17. See Order of Owls v. Owl's Club of McKees Rocks, 99 F. Supp. 555
(W.D. Pa. 1951) ; Society of the War of 1812 v. Society of the War of 1812
in the State of New York, 46 App. Div. 568, 572, 62 N.Y. Supp. 355, 358
(1900).
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which a business can maintain an action for trade name infringe-
ment should be immune from a similar attack by a charitable
organization, no other facts appearing.
In the principal case, where the plaintiff had all the interests
in its name which have been protected by the law of unfair com-
petition, and where there were present all the elements con-
sidered by modern courts as necessary to trade name protection,
together with a finding of fraudulent intent on the defendant's
part, the injunction was rightly granted.
TORTS--LESSOR'S LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTA-
TION TO LESSEE-PURPORTED OFFERS OF THIRD PERSONS
Lessors falsely represented to lessee that one Levine had of-
fered to lease the premises for more than twice the rent lessee
then was paying, and that, unless lessee signed a new lease at the
higher rental, lessors would evict lessee upon expiration of the
existing lease. Relying on this statement, lessee entered into a
new lease at the stipulated rental. Upon discovering the decep-
tion, lessee brought an action for fraud and deceit. Held: de-
fendant's demurrer to plaintiff's declaration sustained. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held: re-
versed and demurrer overruled. Such a false statement to a ten-
ant, coupled with a threat of eviction,' is an actionable misrepre-
sentation and not mere "seller's talk."
2
On these facts most jursidictions would find the defendants
liable for damages that plaintiff had suffered as a result of hav-
ing relied on lessors' statement.3 Massachusetts, however, has
consistently held that vendors' representations regarding pur-
ported offers by third persons were mere "sales talk" and not
1. It is interesting to note the emphasis the plaintiff's brief places on the
defendants' threat of eviction and the then existent (1946) shortage of
commercial rental premises in Boston. The presence of this duress rendered
the fraud constructed by the defendants a very thorough one. [Plaintiff's
brief, pp. 11-14.]
2. Kabatehnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corporation, 103 N.E.2d 692(Mass. 1952).
3. Baloyan v. Furniture Exhibition Bldg. Co., 258 Mich. 244, 241 N.W.
886 (1932); Brody v. Foster, 134 Minn. 91, 158 N.W. 824 (1916); Mon-
santo Chemical Works v. American Zinc, Lead, & Smelting Co., 253 S.W.
1006 (Mo. 1923); Isman v. Loring, 130 App. Div. 845, 115 N.Y. Supp. 933
(1st Dep't. 1909); Seaman v. Becar, 15 Misc. 616, 38 N. Y. Supp. 69 (Sup.
Ct. 1896); Caples v. Morgan, 81 Ore. 692, 160 Pac. 1154 (1916); Strick-
land v. Graybill, 97 Va. 602, 34 S.E. 475 (1899).
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